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Abstract  
 
Legislators’ behaviour in and outside parliament is shaped most crucially by the electoral 
rules. Existing studies literature linking electoral systems, personal vote-seeking incentives, 
and legislative behaviour, however, have been hindered by the lack of comparative data and 
‘direct evidence of a personal vote’ (Shugart 2008: 46). This chapter conducts a systematic, 
two-step analysis of how electoral systems affect the representational role and behaviour of 
legislators using data from the PARTIREP MP survey. In the first step, we test the impact of 
different electoral system characteristics (i.e. ballot structure and district magnitude) upon the 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote as legislators perceive them. In line with Zittel and 
Gschwend’s (2008) notion of ‘campaign norms’, legislators were asked to assess the relative 
utility of personal compared to party campaigns in attaining re-election. In the second step, 
the chapter uses this arguably more direct measurement of personal vote-seeking incentives as 
a mediator variable to explain the impact formal electoral rules have on two oft-cited 
indicators of personal and partisan vote-seeking: legislators’ commitment to constituency 
service and to upholding party discipline.  
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Introduction 
 
Electoral institutions, it has commonly been argued, shape the behaviour, attitudes, and 
orientations of Members of Parliament. Legislators, Mayhew (1974) famously observed, are 
foremost driven by the desire to retain their seat in parliament – a necessary condition for 
achieving other, more intrinsically valuable goals (see also Fenno 1978). The focus of 
legislators’ ‘permanent campaign’ (Blumenthal 1980; Butler and Collins 2001) is, however, 
affected by the electoral institutions they compete under for re-election. Mayhew’s (1974) 
Congressional study on the ‘electoral connection’ has inspired a vast body of literature 
exploring the manner in which electoral institutions affect what legislators do in parliament 
and beyond. Electoral institutions, Carey and Shugart (1995) specified, determine the relative 
value of personal and party reputations to legislators in securing re-election and thereby 
restrict the range of vote-seeking strategies they can successfully pursue. Individualized 
campaign strategies may translate into (at least) two personal vote-seeking actions: 
constituency service and dissent from the party line. On the one hand, legislators can develop 
a reputation of good constituency members by helping individual constituents with their 
demands for casework and by advocating the constituency’s collective economic and social 
needs (e.g. Searing 1994). On the other hand, legislators may feel the need to differentiate 
themselves from their parliamentary party by taking positions countering party stands or even 
by voting against their party on issues that are salient to constituents (especially when 
government survival is not at stake) (e.g. Carey 2007). 
 
Besides suffering from an Anglo-American bias, most existing studies dealing with the 
connection between electoral rules, member attitudes and behaviour are either theoretical (e.g. 
Carey and Shugart 1995) or are case studies in which electoral rules are a constant rather than 
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a variable (e.g. Fenno 1978; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). Comparative studies are 
scarce and often include a very limited number of cases with only slightly diverse electoral 
systems (e.g. Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Pilet, Freire, and Costa 2012). In addition, 
the current literature linking electoral systems, personal vote-seeking incentives, and 
legislative behaviour has been hindered by the lack of ‘direct evidence of a personal vote’ 
(Shugart 2008, 46). Empirical studies typically go directly from the electoral rules to various – 
often aggregate-level – proxies. The effect electoral rules have on any single indicator tends to 
be obfuscated by the simple fact that legislators trade off a wide variety of activities 
contributing to a personal vote (André and Depauw 2013). 
 
Aiming to address these shortcomings in the current literature, this chapter performs a 
systematic, two-step analysis of how electoral systems affect legislators’ attitudes of 
unprecedented scale using data from the PARTIREP comparative legislators’ survey. In the first 
step, we test the impact of different electoral system features on the incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote as legislators perceive them. In line with Zittel and Gschwend’s (2008) notion 
of ‘campaign norms’, legislators were asked to assess the relative utility of personal compared 
to party campaigns in attaining re-election. In the second step, the chapter uses this arguably 
more direct measurement of personal vote-seeking incentives as a mediator variable to explain 
the impact formal electoral rules have on two oft-cited indicators of personal and partisan 
vote-seeking: legislators’ commitment to constituency representation and to upholding party 
discipline.  The findings clearly establish that the type of electoral system has a significant 
impact on the person or party-centred character of the vote-seeking strategies legislators 
pursue: personal vote-seeking is strongest in strong preferential systems and/or systems with 
small districts (in at least one tier), whereas it is weakest in closed-list systems and/or systems 
with large districts. Constituency service and dissent in parliament, the analysis demonstrates, 
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are two common ways to cultivate a personal reputation among constituents. Now, before 
turning to the two-step analysis in sections four and five, the theoretical foundations are 
discussed, more precise hypotheses are formulated and the data are presented. 
 
 
Theoretical framework and expectations 
 
Most existing typologies classify electoral rules based on the electoral formulae distinguishing 
between majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) systems (see e.g. Farrell 2001). 
But, Carey and Shugart (1995) famously argued that the relative value of personal compared 
to party reputations in securing re-election depends critically on the openness of the electoral 
system, which is strongly connected with the way voters’ options are structured on the ballot. 
Ceteris paribus, legislators’ personal vote-seeking incentives will be stronger in system that 
allow voters to express a preference for individual candidates than in systems that only allow 
them to endorse the party list as a whole (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Carey and Shugart 1995). 
Based on the choices voters face in the voting booth and the effectiveness of preferential 
voting in determining which candidates are elected, four basic types of electoral systems can 
be distinguished: non-preferential systems, mixed-member systems, strong preferential 
systems, and weak preferential systems. Constituency-oriented actions, as a result, should be 
more common in the presence of intra-party candidate choice than in the absence. 
 
Legislators’ incentives to nurture a personal reputation among constituents are weakest in 
non-preferential systems. Voters can only endorse the party ticket and are not offered the 
opportunity to express a preference for one or more co-partisan candidates. Under these 
circumstances, the (re-)election prospects of candidates are inextricably tied to their party’s 
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electoral performance. Elected representatives will concentrate on strengthening the party’s 
collective reputation for the party leaders entrusted with the selection and ranking of 
candidates are typically considered their primary principals (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Carey 
and Shugart 1995). Only in low-magnitude districts legislators may still have an incentive to 
pursue individualized campaigns: by putting a face to the party, a legislator may draw 
additional votes to the party and in turn increase his own probability of maintaining a seat in 
parliament (Shugart 2008). The category of non-preferential systems comprises closed-list PR 
systems, as well as single-member plurality or majority systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). In 
neither system can a vote for a candidate be separated from a vote for the party (Karvonen 
2004). Voters can only sanction individual legislators at the high cost of changing party 
affiliation (Mitchell 2000).  
 
Mixed-members systems are classified as a distinctive type of non-preferential system. 
Although mixed systems encompass quite some institutional variation
1
, they all have (at least) 
two separate overlapping tiers: one tier must entail allocation of seats nominally whereas seats 
in the other tiers must be allocated by proportional representation from party lists (Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001, 10). On the one hand, these systems are often characterized as the ‘best 
of both worlds’. That is, the incentive structure facing legislators elected in the PR and SMD 
tiers are assumed not to differ from those in pure closed-list and single-member 
plurality/majority systems (e.g. Lancaster 1986). On the other hand, scholars increasingly 
point at spill-over or contamination effects as a result of combining several tiers. It is the 
assumption that political actors in mixed systems respond strategically to the unique 
competing incentives generated by the majoritarian and proportional components (Herron and 
Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schoppa 2002). In particular, the relative value of personal and 
party reputations depends on the mode of candidacy – that is, whether legislators 
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simultaneously stand for election in both tiers or whether they only pursue one type of 
mandate (Bawn and Thies 2003; Zittel 2012). Dual-listed candidates can be expected to 
respond to the incentives generated by the majoritarian tier, even if they wind up being 
elected off the party list (Pekkanen, Byblade, and Krauss 2006). Running an individualized 
constituency campaign not only increases a candidate’s chances of winning the more 
prestigious district seat, it also increases the likelihood of obtaining a more secure list position 
in future elections (Patzelt 2007; Zittel and Gschwend 2008). In addition, the campaign 
strategies of district representatives in mixed systems may well be even more personalized 
than those of legislators in pure SMD systems. In the latter system, legislators are the sole 
incumbents running in their district and face less resourceful challengers. In mixed systems, 
on the other hand, the incumbency effect is less strong: members elected in the second tier 
often end up ‘shadowing’ the district member who defeated them by organizing and soliciting 
casework (Lundberg 2007; Carman and Shephard 2007). With the feeling of other incumbents 
breathing down their necks, these district members will have to invest even more resources to 
bolster up their personal reputation in order to win the harsh competition over personal votes. 
 
‘Pure’ or ‘strong’ preferential systems constitute the opposite end of the continuum. 
Legislators’ incentives to pursue an individualized campaign are expected to be strongest 
when voters may cast one or more preference votes and nominal votes alone determine the 
order in which seats are allocated to candidates (Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2008). Intra-party 
preference voting, by definition, rules out voters’ ability to rely solely on the shared party 
label as a readily available voting cue and requires legislators to set themselves apart from co-
partisan competitors in constituents’ minds (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). It is the 
assumption that incentives to cultivate a personal vote increase with the scope of intra-party 
competition, that is the number of candidates running under the party label per seat available 
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(Carey and Shugart 1995).
2
 But, intra-party competition may be more black-and-white than a 
matter of degree: as few as one or two viable co-partisan competitors may prompt legislators 
to court a personal vote and increasing that number may only marginally affects the strength 
of these incentives (André, Depauw, and Deschouwer 2012). Both single-transferable vote 
and open-list PR systems fall within the category of strong preferential systems. In PR-STV, all 
candidates appear on the ballot in alphabetical order, discouraging voters to organize their 
ordinal preferences along party lines. In this highly competitive electoral environment, co-
partisans compete with each other for the first preferences of loyal party voters and undecided 
voters, and for the lower preferences of voters committed to other parties (Gallagher 2008). In 
open-list PR systems, on the other hand, candidates are grouped on ordered or (partly) 
alphabetical party lists. As the party-preferred ranking of candidates is merely an advice 
voters may choose to disregard, a high list position does not translate into a formal electoral 
advantage (Katz and Bardi 1980).  
 
In ‘weak’ preferential systems or flexible-list PR elected representatives should be more 
inclined to cultivate a personal reputation than legislators in non-preferential systems, but less 
so than legislators in strong preferential systems. The allocation of seats to candidates is based 
on the number of preference votes they gathered as well as on their position on the party list 
(Marsh 1985; Karvonen 2004). Therefore, the electoral utility of running an individualized 
campaign to a large extent depends on the number of preference votes required to ‘leapfrog’ 
past higher ranked candidates and voters’ propensity to utilize their possibility to express one 
or more candidate preferences (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Norris 2006). A good personal score 
in any case increases a legislator’s probability of being assigned to a legislative, executive, or 
party post with high visibility and raises his chances of obtaining a more secure position near 
the top of the list at the next election.  
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Another component of electoral system design besides ballot structure that the literature puts 
front and centre is district magnitude. Though the number of seats to be allocated in a district 
can take a wide range of values, existing research has focused by and large on the binary 
distinction between single-seat and multi-seat districts (see e.g. Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 
2005). It has been the dominant assumption that the personal vote incentives facing legislators 
in multi-seat districts are weaker than those facing legislators in single-seat districts. Where 
each legislator represents a distinct geographical area, the accountability linkage is strongest 
(Lancaster 1986; Scholl 1986; Pilet, Freire, and Costa 2012). On the one hand, elected 
representatives can directly be rewarded for promoting constituents’ interests. Blame, on the 
other hand, is equally indivisible: constituents can easily sanction their representative for 
shirking their demands (Buck and Cain 1990; Bowler and Farrell 1993). In the context of 
dyadic representation (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004), as a result, developing a favourable 
personal reputation among constituents is key to a legislator’s electoral success. In multi-seat 
districts, by contrast, representation has a more collective, partisan dimension. Legislators 
have the opportunity to either free-ride on the achievements of other representatives or pass 
them the buck. They, thereby, obfuscate the ability of rationally ignorant voters to monitor 
their actions and assign them credit and blame. Competition for votes, as a consequence, will 
quickly become less personalized as districts grow in magnitude (Wessels 1999; Pilet, Freire, 
and Costa 2012), in turn decreasing the electoral utility of constituency service and voting 
dissent in parliament. 
 
Carey and Shugart (1995) famously added, however, that district magnitudes’ effect is 
contingent upon the ballot structure. That is, the balance legislators strike between candidate-
centred and party-centred vote-seeking strategies depends on the interaction between district 
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magnitude and ballot structure. Personal vote incentives are expected to decrease with 
magnitude in closed-list systems, but increase with magnitude in systems with intra-party 
candidate choice. As the number of candidates running in a district increases in systems with 
fixed party lists, on the one hand, voters will increasingly rely on parties’ labels to reach an 
‘informed’ decision. Strengthening the party’s collective reputation gains relevance under 
these circumstances. In systems where preference votes are effective in determining the order 
of intra-party seat allocation, on the other hand, voters increasingly turn to candidate-specific 
information in the voting booth. The more co-partisan candidates a legislator competes 
against, the harder it is to distinguish himself from the throng, and the more effort he will 
have to put into developing a personal reputation. 
 
 
Data 
 
The study of how electoral rules shape legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal or party 
reputation among constituents has largely been hindered by the unavailability of appropriate 
data (Shugart 2008). Comparative research is scarce and empirical studies typically resort to 
various – often aggregate-level – proxies. To explore how electoral rules shape legislators’ 
personal-vote incentives and how these incentives translate into legislative behaviour, we rely 
on the extensive data collection efforts of the IAP PARTIREP project. The cross-national 
legislator survey covers fifteen national and fifty-eight regional parliaments in a range of 
European democracies. The selected parliaments, table 1 indicates, map onto different 
electoral system contexts in terms of electoral formula and ballot structure. District magnitude 
also varies widely across and generally even within cases – ranging from single-member 
districts to at-large region or nationwide districts. In some countries, different systems are 
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combined to elect the legislators of a single parliament. In others, a different set of rules 
applies across levels of government and/or across regions. Variation in the response rate 
across cases, moreover, is not systematically related to the type of electoral system in use. 
 
[table 1] 
 
Members of the UK House of Commons and the French National Assembly are elected in 
single-seat districts respectively using a ‘first-past-the-post’ system and two-round majority 
system, respectively. Multi-seat districts with closed party lists are employed in Austria (for 
the upper tiers), France (for the regional assemblies), Italy (for the Camera dei Deputati and 
the Tuscan regional council), Israel, Norway
3
, Portugal, and Spain. The mixed electoral 
systems used in Germany, Hungary, Scotland, and Wales combine single-member districts 
and closed party lists. Strong preferential systems are found in Ireland (PR-STV), Italy (some 
regional councils), Poland, and Switzerland (open-list PR). But, there is substantial variation in 
the way voters can express a preference for individual candidates. In Poland, voters have to 
cast a single preference vote. Voters’ choice of candidates is similarly constrained to one in 
Calabria, Lazio, and Lombardia.
4
 Two candidates can be selected in Campania and three in 
Valle d’Aosta. In Switzerland, by contrast, voters have two options: they may support a party 
list without indicating a candidate preference or they may cast as many preference votes as 
there are seats to be filled in the district. They can, moreover, vote for candidates of different 
parties (i.e. panachage) and/or vote for the same candidate twice (i.e. cumulative voting). 
Flexible-list systems, finally, are used in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but here too 
there are important differences in the method by which preference votes may alter the party’s 
predetermined list ranking. In Austria
5
 and the Netherlands
6
, candidates reaching a particular 
quota of preference votes are elected regardless of their list position – provided of course their 
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party has won sufficient seats. The remaining seats are allocated in the order candidates 
appear on the list (Andeweg 2008  M ller 2008). In Belgium, on the other hand, half of the 
votes cast for the party list (i.e. ballots without a candidate preference) are transferred to the 
highest ranked candidates until they clear the electoral quota. When the supply of list votes in 
exhausted, the process of intra-party seat allocation proceeds in the order of preference votes 
(De Winter 2008).
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Electoral Rules and Campaign Strategies 
 
To capture legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal or party reputation, we build on Zittel 
& Gschwend’s (2008, 988) notion of campaign norms. The question in the PARTIREP survey 
assessing whether legislators “subjectively seek personal votes” was worded as follows:  
 
“To retain their seat in the Parliament, Members of Parliament often face hard choices. How would 
you choose to allocate your limited resources? Would you choose to spend more effort and money 
on achieving the goal on the left-hand side, would you choose to spend more effort and money on 
the goal on the right-hand side, or would the allocation of resources to both goals be about equal?” 
A scale was offered ranging from 1 [a personal campaign] to 5 [a party campaign]. 
 
To ease interpretation of the results, the dependent variable was trichotomized and reversed: a 
value of ‘1’ indicates a party-centred campaign, ‘3’ indicates an individualized campaign 
strategy and ‘2’ reflects a combination of both campaign styles.8 Table 2 presents the 
proportion of legislators in each of the three categories and shows the distribution of 
legislators’ preferred campaign strategy by country and by ballot type. Even though there 
exist substantial variation in legislators’ campaign norms, the figures underline a strong 
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partisan component in the process of representation in Europe: 41 per cent of all legislators 
place themselves at the party-centred end of the continuum and 26 per cent gravitates towards 
the centre of the scale.
9
 But, electoral rules seem to matter in shaping a legislator’s perceived 
utility of personal and party reputations in securing re-election. Elected representatives in 
countries with non- or weak preferential systems clearly prefer party-centred campaigns (e.g. 
Austria, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain), whereas in countries with strong-
preferential electoral rules (e.g. Ireland, Poland), the importance of personal campaigning is 
emphasized. In Germany and Hungary legislators, it seems, try to keep a balance between 
person and party in response to mixed electoral incentives. In case distinct rules are applied at 
different levels of government, however, percentages aggregated at the country-level might 
obscure within-country variation. The same picture crystalizes when the data are sorted by 
ballot type. More than one in two legislators elected in closed-list systems favours cultivating 
the party’s collective reputation, whereas approximately two in five legislators elected in 
strong preferential systems actively seek personal votes. As expected, the two ‘hybrid’ 
systems fall somewhere in between ‘pure’ open and closed systems. Elected representatives in 
mixed-member systems tend to gravitate towards the middle and candidate-centred end of the 
scale, while those in flexible-list systems run more party-intensive campaigns. 
 
[table 2] 
 
To isolate the effect of electoral rules, we estimate partial proportional odds models (Williams 
2006), which is the most parsimonious estimation technique to analyse a three-category 
ordinal dependent variable.
10
 This type of model relaxes the parallel lines assumption only for 
those independent variables violating the assumption, uncovering their differential effect 
across categories of the dependent variable. Constrained variables have one line of estimates 
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in table 3 and their interpretation does not differ from interpreting ordered logit coefficients. 
Unconstrained variables, on the other hand, have two lines of estimates: the first line 
represents the coefficient for campaigns with at least some personal component (2 and 3) in 
contrast with party-focussed campaigns (1); the second line displays the coefficient for a 
predominantly individualized campaign strategy (3) in contrast with categories 1 and 2. As it 
is not inconceivable that there are country differences in campaign styles, standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level.
11
  
 
In testing the effect electoral rules have on the balance legislators strike between cultivating 
personal and party reputations, it is important to acknowledge that a number of other factors 
will shape the focus of their campaign strategy that need to be controlled for in the analysis. 
First, a legislator’s perceived ideological distance from his party should increase the 
attractiveness of developing a distinct personal profile (Zittel and Gschwend 2008). About 43 
per cent of the legislators in the sample fully share their party’s ideological values and 
platform. Their self-placement on an eleven-point left-right scale does not deviate from the 
score they assigned their party. Another 37 and 14 per cent perceive a distance of respectively 
one and two scale points. Second, the campaign focus of legislators affiliated to right-wing 
political parties might be more personal in nature than that of left-wing party representatives. 
Party ideologies on the right of the political spectrum are often characterized as 
individualistic, whereas leftist ideologies tend to promote collectivism. Third, members of 
governing parties can be expected to pursue more individualized campaigns than those in 
opposition parties. The discrepancy between campaign promises and unredeemed 
expectations typically results in vote loss for governing parties – mid-term being the nadir of 
popularity (e.g. Van Der Eijk 1987). In this uncongenial re-election context, legislators may 
try to protect themselves from broader partisan swings by putting more emphasis on one’s 
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personal characteristics and achievements as compared to the party’s collective record (Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Kam 2009). Fourth, elected representatives of large mainstream 
parties will likely favour more candidate-centred campaigns. While small and niche parties 
lack local embedment, mainstream parties have a well-developed organization at the 
grassroots. These local structures and networks facilitate legislators’ efforts in developing and 
maintaining high visibility and name recognition among constituents (Zittel and Gschwend 
2008). In line with Ezrow’s (Ezrow 2010, 12) definition, political parties belonging to the 
Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative party families are coded 
as mainstream.
12
 
 
The analysis further controls for a legislator’s seniority. Veteran legislators have entered the 
protectionist stage of their career and try to consolidate the measure of trust and political 
support they have established among constituents over the years (Fenno 1978; Norton and 
Wood 1993). In addition, seniority and apprenticeship go hand in hand: senior 
parliamentarians are more likely to be assigned posts in parliament, in the committees, in the 
party, and possibly in the executive (Johannes 1980; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005). 
The number of years a legislator has served in parliament should therefore be negatively 
related to his propensity to pursue an individualized campaign. A final control we add to the 
model is a dichotomous variable indicating regional parliaments. Members of regional 
assemblies are generally elected in districts with smaller constituent/representative ratios 
which should result in more direct contact (Patzelt 2007; Curtice and Shively 2009). 
Candidate-centred campaign strategies can therefore be expected to be more common at the 
lower levels of government. We now turn to the results of the multivariate analysis. 
 
[table 3] 
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The results presented in table 4 provide strong support for the main hypothesis: personal-vote 
seeking through individualized campaign strategies is markedly more valuable to legislators 
in open-list systems as compared to those elected on fixed party lists. Legislators’ predicted 
probability of cultivating a personal reputation among constituents increases by 17 per cent 
when preference votes are the sole criterion for allocating seats to candidates.
13
 The 
probability of running a party-centred campaign, on the other hand, decreases from .54 in 
closed-list systems to .33 in open-list systems, a change significant at the .05 level. But no 
support is found for Carey and Shugart’s (1995) oft-cited hypothesis that the effect of district 
magnitude is contingent upon the ballot structure. Legislators’ incentives to pursue a person-
intensive campaign in open-list systems do not increase with the scope of intra-party 
competition. District magnitude, on the contrary, has an invariably negative effect in all list 
types as demonstrated by the multiplicative interaction terms included in model 2. This effect 
is, however, largely driven by districts with a magnitude of one (in a similar vein, see Pilet, 
Freire, and Costa 2012). A legislator’s predicted probability of seeking out personal votes 
decrease by 19 per cent when multiple seats are allocated in the district. When isolating 
single-member districts in the analysis, moreover, we can no longer be sure at any level of 
statistical significance that legislators’ campaign norms become increasingly party-centred as 
magnitude grows (model 3). That is, an increase in district magnitude from 1 to 2 seats is 
more consequential for legislators’ behaviour than an increase from 21 to 22 for instance. As 
the number of (co-partisan) competitors grows, voters become increasingly unable and 
unwilling to learn about the characteristics, stands, and records of individual candidates. Even 
in open-list systems, legislators’ personal vote incentives may therefore quickly be 
outweighed by the increasing efforts and resources needed to communicate a personal 
reputation to voters. 
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The campaign focus of legislators in flexible-list systems seems to be somewhat more 
candidate-centred than in closed-list systems (8%) but less so than in open-list systems (9%) – 
though these changes in predicted probabilities cannot be distinguished from zero at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. This group of systems seems to be too 
heterogeneous a category to generate a univocal effect. Not only do these systems vary from 
each other based on the details of the electoral rules (e.g. quota or transfer system), but the 
same set of formal rules may present legislators with different incentives and constraints 
depending on their position on the party list and the actual number of preference votes 
required to alter their rank. To scale these flexible-lists systems on the continuum between 
‘pure’ closed and open-list systems requires a case-by-case judgement accounting for possible 
intra-system variation (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005; Shugart 2008) that is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
 
Table 3 further reveals that, in contrast with closed-list systems, legislators’ campaign 
strategies in mixed-member systems are considerably more candidate-intensive. The predicted 
probability of running a highly individualized campaign is approximately 12 per cent higher 
in mixed systems – an increase significant only at a more lenient level of .10. But, legislators 
primarily end up in the middle category responding to the competing incentives generated by 
the different tiers. They have more than 50 per cent chance of combining both campaign 
styles, a probability which is 22 per cent higher than in closed-list systems. Mixed systems 
appear to be more than a mere sum of their parts. The mode of candidacy seems to be an 
important cause of spill-over effects, explaining why legislators in mixed systems more 
frequently opt to bolster up their personal reputation. 
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When restricting the analysis to mixed-member systems in table 4, we find clear differences 
in the campaign focus of successful district candidates, defeated district candidates elected on 
the party list, and ‘list-only’ candidates. For district members, the personal vote incentives 
generated by the SMD tier always override the incentives emanating from the PR component – 
even if they are granted a secure position on the party list. They are 41 per cent more likely to 
run a predominantly candidate-centred campaign than list-only members and 20 per cent more 
likely to do so than list members simultaneously pursuing a district mandate. On the other 
hand, the electoral utility of an individualized campaign to dual-listed candidates that were 
rejected by the district in which they stood for election depends on their party affiliation. Only 
candidates from the large mainstream parties that have a reasonable chance of winning district 
seats and have well-developed local branches are more inclined to favour personal over party 
reputations. Small and niche parties, by contrast, field candidates in the SMD races merely to 
increase the party’s vote share in the PR (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 2005). 
The widespread use of split-ticket voting turns their district candidates into ‘hopeless’ 
contestants (Patzelt 2007). But in return, these candidates are rewarded with a higher position 
on the party list. As a result, the incentives facing small party candidates standing 
simultaneously in both tiers strongly resemble those facing list specialists: cultivating the 
party’s collective reputation is much more important is securing re-election than seeking out 
personal votes. 
 
[table 4] 
 
Over and above the effect of electoral rules, party-related factors have an impact on the 
candidate or party-centred nature of a legislator’s campaign. Personal vote-seeking strategies 
are more appealing to legislators identifying more loosely with their party. Legislators feeling 
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more distant from their party in ideological terms are significantly more likely to favour 
personal over party reputations. But the effect is rather small substantively: the predicted 
probability of running a predominantly individualized campaign is only 3 per cent lower for 
the strongest identifiers than for legislators perceiving a one-point deviance between their 
own and their party’s position on the left-right scale and 12 per cent lower for those 
perceiving a three-point deviance. In addition, representatives from left-wing parties are 
considerably more party-centred in their campaign focus than those from right-wing parties. 
Changing a party’s position on the left-right scale from 3 to 7 – that is the mean minus and 
plus one standard deviation – decreases a legislators likelihood of prioritising a more 
collective party campaign by 13 per cent. Elected representatives from governing parties, 
moreover, have a slightly higher likelihood of pursuing a candidate-intensive campaign. A 
favourable personal reputation might help individual legislators to compensate for the 
generally lower levels of party popularity at the end of the term either by winning personal 
votes or by giving the party a human face in the district. Personal campaigning, finally, is also 
more common among legislators affiliated to the large mainstream parties with established 
local structures and vital grassroots but the effect does not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Seniority and the level of government hardly affect a legislator’s 
campaign choices. 
 
 
Campaign strategies, constituency service and party discipline 
 
In the previous section we linked electoral rules to legislators’ campaign norms as they 
perceive them – arguably a more direct measure of personal vote incentives. In the second 
step of the analysis, we assess whether and to what extent differences in the candidate- or 
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party-centred nature of campaign strategies translate into attitudinal and behavioural 
differences in the way legislators perceive their representative tasks. We will focus on two 
oft-cited indicators of personal and partisan vote-seeking: legislators’ commitment to 
constituency service on the one hand, and to upholding party discipline on the other. Based on 
the extensive literature reviewed in the first sections of our chapter, we hypothesise that 
legislators who prioritize cultivating their personal reputation in their campaigns will be more 
eager to show constituents that they care about their needs. As a result, personal vote-seekers 
are expected to focus on their constituencies to a greater extent than those pursuing 
predominantly party-centred campaigns. Additionally, we expect them to be more relaxed in 
their attitudes toward party discipline as well: they should be more willing to desert the party 
opinion when it conflicts with the interest of their districts. Since one cannot be entirely 
certain about the direction of causality, we use symmetric measures to analyse the correlation 
between legislators’ campaign norms and their degree of constituency orientation. 
 
The relation of personal vote-seeking to constituency service is twofold: on the one hand, it 
relates to the strength of a legislator’s constituency orientation and it shows in the activities 
carried out in district, on the other hand. First, we find a significant relationship between the 
campaign strategies legislators pursue and the focus of representation they choose. The 
PARTIREP MP survey asked legislators to indicate on a seven-point scale how important they 
consider it to promote the views and interests of all the people who voted for their party and 
of the people in their constituency.
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 Table 5 shows the importance the average legislator in 
the sample attaches to promoting the interests of the two different groups of people. In 
addition, party promoters put greater emphasis on representing the party voters, whereas 
legislators pursuing a more individualized campaign favour to look after the people in their 
districts. Overall averages (5.77 and 5.7 points) indicate that respondents rated both categories 
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generously: both the party electorate and the constituents seem exceptionally important to 
represent. For this reason, the relative importance of party and constituency representation 
was calculated by a simple division of ratings to show whether individual campaigners are 
indeed more inclined to focus on their constituencies. The results support the initial 
hypothesis: personal vote-seekers actually consider the promotion of constituency interests 
more important than both party campaigners and those who try to balance between the two 
strategies. 
 
[table 5] 
 
Second, legislators’ decision as to whether or not to engage in certain constituency-oriented 
activities that bolster up their reputation and visibility among constituents also varies under 
different campaign strategies. Personal vote-seekers are significantly (p<.05) more likely to 
“attend (or send out letters on the occasion of) weddings, wedding anniversaries, and 
funerals”, “send out personal newsletters”, and “meet with local businesses and action 
groups” and they do so more frequently than members prioritizing a more party-intensive 
campaign. Additionally, representatives favouring personal over party reputation appear to be 
more likely to “meet with (small parties of) constituents in their private home to talk about 
their wants and needs”, “hold surgeries”, “advertise (…) constituency work services” and 
“publicize (…) successes in attracting business and obtaining government grants for the local 
area” as well. But the frequency for these activities is the same under the different campaign 
strategies.  
 
[table 6] 
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Personal vote-seeking is not only connected to legislators’ behaviour in the district, but it has 
implications for party discipline in parliament as well. We measure dissent on the attitudinal 
level using the concept of the style of representation, capturing a legislator’s willingness to 
desert the party line. Representatives were asked, in case of conflict, to trade off their party’s 
opinion with their personal judgment on the one hand and their voters’ opinion on the other. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of answers over the different campaign strategies. Figures 
indicate that the average legislator would choose to vote in line with the party’s opinion in 
case of conflict with either his/her own opinion or with that of the voters: 60.4 per cent of all 
representatives said that they would follow the party, even if this implies setting aside their 
personal judgment. The partisan preference is even stronger when it comes to choosing 
between the voter and the party: 64.7 per cent thinks that they should vote with the PPG. The 
results demonstrate the same pattern when we examine the distribution of answers over the 
different campaign strategies. In every category, the party’s opinion prevails. There are, 
however, significant differences in the dominance of the party-centred answers. 50 per cent of 
the personal vote-seekers think that they should take their own opinion as a guideline, and 
42.5 per cent would stick with the voters’ will in case of a conflict. Both percentages exceed 
the proportion of those who would vote against the party in the other two groups. This 
indicates that personal vote-seekers are more willing to desert the party lines than members 
pursuing party-centred campaigns. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the recent wave of reform debates, it has often been argued that the quality of political 
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representation depends not only on the ideological congruence between the represented and 
those acting on their behalf, but also on the strength of the representative relationship (e.g. 
Norris 2006; Shugart 2008; Freire and Meirinho 2012). This chapter has sought to contribute 
to this topical discussion by studying, on an unprecedented scale, how electoral systems affect 
the legislators’ vote-seeking strategies and behavioural patterns. Electoral institutions, it was 
demonstrated, affect legislators’ campaign strategies.  Legislators elected on the basis of their 
preference votes alone are considerably more likely to pursue an individualized campaign that 
distinguishes themselves from co-partisan competitors than those elected in closed-list 
systems. Hybrid systems, on the other hand, fall somewhere in-between open and closed-list 
systems: legislators elected in flexible-list systems and mixed-member systems tend to 
combine both campaign strategies. As districts increase in magnitude, however, legislators’ 
predicted probability of running a candidate-centred campaign decreases. More than being a 
difference of degree, the effect of district magnitude is a difference of kind: legislators’ 
campaign strategies in multi-seat districts are more party-focused than in single-seat districts. 
 
Legislators’ decision as to the type of campaign to pursue, moreover, has important 
consequences for what they do in and outside parliament in-between election campaigns. 
Electoral rules that incentivize legislators to run a personalized campaign not only increase 
the amount and quality of services offered to constituents, but also enhance members’ 
potential to desert the party lines. Personal vote-seeking was found to increase the value of 
being congruent with constituents’ preferences in terms of voting behaviour in parliament, 
whenever there is a conflict between voters’ and party’s preferences. In sum, the recent trend 
towards systems that allow for effective intra-party choice might the constituent-
representative relationship, but might also increase the potential dissolution of party unity and 
thereby challenge the responsible party model that as dominant theory explaining 
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representation and governance in contemporary Europe. Perhaps the problem here is one of 
balance and admitting that the ‘best of both worlds’ might not be entirely possible.       
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Table 1: Electoral Rules in 15 European democracies 
 
  BALLOT STRUCTURE DISTRICT MAGNITUDE 
  closed mixed flexible Open min max. mean 
Austria nat. X  X  1 36 7.5 
 reg. (9) X  X  1 26 6.6 
Belgium nat.   X  4 24 13.6 
 reg. (4)   X  2 72 35.1 
France nat. X    1 1 1 
 reg. (2) X    8 25 15.6 
Germany nat.  X   1 65 2 
 reg. (4)  X   1 65 1.9 
Hungary   X   1 64 1.9 
Ireland     X 3 5 3.9 
Israel  X    120 120 120 
Italy nat. X    1 44 24.2 
 reg. (6) X   X 1 42 8.9 
Netherlands    X  150 150 150 
Norway  X    4 17 8.9 
Poland     X 7 19 11.2 
Portugal nat. X    2 47 10.5 
 reg. (2) X    2 47 26.4 
Spain nat. X    1 35 6.7 
 reg. (4) X    11 85 23.2 
Switzerland nat.    X 1 34 7.7 
 reg. (25)    X 1 100 19.6 
United Kingdom nat. X    1 1 1 
 reg. (2)  X   1 7 1.5 
Note: The table summarizes the electoral rules used by country and level of government. The number of 
regional parliaments is indicated between brackets. Closed denotes the non-preferential systems; mixed the 
mixed-members systems; flexible the weak preferential systems; and open the strong preferential systems. 
Source: PARTIREP MP survey. 
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Table 2: Campaign strategies in 15 European countries 
 
  Party versus Personal Campaigns 
 
1 2 3 
Country 
Austria 50.08 32.32 17.61 
Belgium 29.52 37.74 32.74 
France 19.22 26.44 54.34 
Germany 19.07 45.21 35.73 
Hungary 22.24 49.62 28.14 
Ireland 16.19 32.4 51.42 
Israel 41.59 29.76 28.65 
Italy 45.62 21.96 32.42 
Netherlands 73.93 9.84 16.23 
Norway 77.95 18.94 3.11 
Poland 8.37 39.22 52.41 
Portugal 53.95 37.55 8.49 
Spain 72.21 21.4 6.39 
Switzerland 38.41 30.66 30.93 
United Kingdom 22.29 42.07 35.64 
Ballot structure 
Closed 54.98 26.08 18.94 
Mixed 20.16 46.69 33.15 
Flexible 46.01 30.47 23.52 
Open 30.03 32.16 37.81 
Overall average 40.81 32.84 26.35 
Note: Entries are the frequencies in each category (percentages). Source: 
PARTIREP MP survey.  
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Table 3: Electoral Rules and Campaign Strategies  
 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 
b. s.e. b. s.e. b. s.e. 
Open-list 
.899 (.349)*** 1.441 (.538)*** 1.059 (.362)*** 
    1.368 (.533)***     
Flexible-list 
.468 (.431) .625 (.666) .542 (.409) 
  
.205 (.706) 
  
Mixed-member 
1.546 (.352)*** 1.744 (.417)*** 1.397 (.279)*** 
.687 (.431) .577 (.533) .453 (.360) 
       
Open-list*DM 
    -.449 (.268)*     
    -.519 (.337)     
Flexible-list*DM 
  
-.122 (.531) 
  
  
.195 (.383) 
  
Mixed-member*DM 
    -.165 (.263)     
    .124 (.388)     
       
District Magnitude (log) 
-.588 (.172)*** -.486 (.275)* -.151 (.224) 
    -.627 (.361)*     
Single-member district 
    
1.094 (.360)*** 
               
Ideological Proximity 
.141 (.061)** .138 (.060)** .135 (.062)** 
.254 (.069)*** .249 (.070)*** .250 (.071)*** 
Party's left-right position 
.143 (.039)*** .146 (.039)*** .135 (.036)*** 
            
Governing Party 
.208 (.091)** .217 (.085)** .234 (.079)*** 
      
Mainstream Party 
.370 (.261) .372 (.259) .355 (.253) 
            
       
Seniority (in years) 
.012 (.008) .012 (.008) .009 (.008) 
            
Regional Parliament 
-.070 (.118) -.057 (.132) -.025 (.137) 
               
Constant (1) -.827 (.515) -.973 (.548)* -1.420 (.471)*** 
Constant (2) -2.323 (.570)*** -2.274 (.676)*** -2.927 (.524)*** 
              
N 1996 
 
1996 
 
1996 
 Log pseudo-likelihood -1971.94 
 
-1968.98 
 
-1956.81 
 LR(df) 372.13 (12)*** 378.04 (12)*** 402.40 (12)*** 
Nagelkerke r² 0.192   0.195   0.206   
Note: The table displays the parameter estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a 
partial proportional odds model. * p ≤ .10  ** p ≤ .05  *** p ≤ .01, using two-tailed t-values. 
Source: PARTIREP MP survey.  
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Table 4: The Mode of Candidacy and Campaign Strategies in Mixed-Member Systems 
 
  All parties Mainstream parties 
  b. s.e. b. s.e. 
mode of candidacy (ref. list-only candidate)         
    Successful district candidate 1.590 (.385)*** 2.179 (.490)*** 
    Defeated district candidate .545 (.385) 1.408 (.501)*** 
        
 Constant (1) -.414 (.594) .134 (.860) 
Constant (2) -2.676 (.614)*** -2.807 (.871)*** 
        
 
N 357   245   
Log pseudo-likelihood -348.06 
 
-226.68 
 
LR(df) 56.28 (8)*** 37.60 (9)*** 
Nagelkerke r² 0.166   0.164   
Note: The table displays the parameter estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of a partial 
proportional odds model. Controls for ideological distance, governing party, year of first entry, regional 
parliament and the ratio between district and list seats are not displayed. * p ≤ .10  ** p ≤ .05  *** p ≤ .01, 
using two-tailed t-values. Source: PARTIREP MP survey.  
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Table 5: The average importance of promoting the interests of the different groups of people 
 
 Importance of promoting the interests of... 
 
all the people who 
voted for his/her party 
all the people in his/her 
constituency 
relative importance 
(constituency/party) 
Campaign strategy    
Party 5.96 (1.171) 5.56 (1,420) .986 (.506) 
Both 5.77 (1.201) 5.79 (1.257) 1.054 (.477) 
Personal 5.47 (1.342) 5.79 (1.476) 1.147 (.681) 
Overall average 5.77 (1.243) 5.7 (1.387) 1.051 (.552) 
Significance p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 
Eta .157 .081 .117 
Note: Entries are mean values, standard deviations in parentheses. Source: PARTIREP MP survey. 
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Table 6: Dissent in parliament under different campaign strategies 
 
 
If his/her opinion does not correspond 
with the opinion of the party, the MP 
should vote according to the opinion 
of the... 
If his/her opinion does not correspond 
with the opinion of the voters, the MP 
should vote according to the opinion of 
the... 
 MP party Voters party 
Campaign strategy     
Party 31.3 68.7 31.1 68.9 
Both 41.4 58.6 34.9 65.1 
Personal 50 50 42.5 57.5 
Overall 39.6 60.4 35.3 64.7 
Significance p<.01 p<.01 
Kendall’s tau-c -.164 -.095 
Note: Entries are the frequencies in each category of campaign strategies (percentages). Source: PARTIREP MP 
survey. 
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Notes 
 
 
1
  The German, Scottish and Welsh parliaments use a two-tiered system with single-member plurality at the 
lowest level, whereas at the time the data was collected, the Hungarian mixed system complemented a two-
round majority system with two PR tiers. In all parliaments (incl. the Hungarian one), voters cast two ballots: 
one for a candidate in the first tier and one for a party list in the second tier. The ratio of district to list seats 
varies across parliaments however: the German Bundestag, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and 
Thuringia have a 50:50 ratio, Lower Saxony a 65:35 ratio, Wales a 67:33 ratio, Scotland a 57:43 ratio, and 
Hungary a 46:54 ratio. Only in Wales dual candidacies are not allowed. There are further differences in the 
linkage mechanism between tiers, and the district magnitude, legal threshold, and electoral formula in the PR 
tier (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).      
2
   Crisp et al. (2007) define the degree of intra-party competition as the ratio between the number of co-partisan 
competitors and the expected party magnitude. 
3
  The Norwegian electoral law allows voters to alter the list order of candidates or by striking out names. For 
these changes to take effect, more than half of the party electorate should indicate a preference for the same 
candidate. This has never occurred so far. 
4
   Members of these regional councils use open-list PR, but a majority bonus is allocated to the coalition or party 
list elected for presidency.   
5
  For the Austrian Nationalrat, candidates running in the lowest tier need at least as many preference votes as 
half of the Land-level Hare quota or one sixth of the party vote in the district to be elected in defiance of the 
list order. In the second tier, candidates need to reach the full Hare quota. At the regional level, all 
parliaments use a flexible-list system in the lowest tier. Burgenland, Lower Austria, and Vienna use that 
system in the second tier as well. The quota specified vary widely.  
6
  In the Netherlands, candidates move to the top of the list when their preference votes reach 25 per cent of the 
Hare quota. 
7
   In Belgium, the ‘eligibility threshold’ equals the party’s total district vote divided by the number of seats won 
plus one.  
8
  The scores of ‘4’ and ‘5’ on the original scale are recoded as ‘1’, whereas the scores of ‘1’ and ‘2’ are 
collapsed in ‘3’. 
9
  To correct the bias resulting from the inclusion of all Swiss cantonal parliaments, that high number of 
responses is down weighted to a level comparable with the responses in the other countries. We further 
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correct for the over and underrepresentation of particular political parties by weighing the responses by the 
size of the parliamentary party in each parliament. 
10
   We use Williams’ (2006) software package ‘gologit2’ in Stata. 
11
  The data have a multi-level structure with individual MPs nested in countries. Using clustered standard errors 
is a good way to correct for the non-independence of observations at the country-level. Clustering avoids 
inflated standard errors and decreases the likelihood of committing Type I errors (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002).    
12
  In addition, a handful of parties that would be coded as mainstream based on party family, but that 
systematically receive a small share of the votes are added to the reference category (e.g. the FDP in 
Germany).  
13
 To compute predicted probabilities as well as the 95 per cent confidence intervals for of discrete changes, 
continuous variables were fixed at their mean values (log of district magnitude=1.03; ideological 
distance=0.87  party’s left-right position=4.97; number of years served in parliament=5.27). All dichotomous 
variables were set to zero, save for mainstream party.  
14
  For the sake of presentational purposes, equal distance between scale values is assumed. 
